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MITIGATING THE DISCRETION DISASTER:
HOW CHANGES IN THE LAW CAN HELP FEMA EFFECTUATE
ITS CRITICAL MISSION
Paul G. Rando*

Well the rails are washed out north of town,
We gotta head for higher ground,
We can’t come back till the water goes down,
Five feet high and risin.’
-Johnny Cash, Five Feet High and Rising
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2021, Hurricane Ida made landfall in Louisiana as a
Category Four hurricane with wind speeds of 150 mph.1 Ida knocked out
the power to the entire city of New Orleans, including hospitals and sewer
systems.2 From New Orleans, the storm raged northeast, ultimately
causing major flooding, death, and billions of dollars in property damage
in east coast states including New Jersey and New York.3
Survivors whose homes get damaged or destroyed in disasters such as
Ida seek help from the federal government through the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”).4 FEMA, empowered by the
Stafford Act,5 helps survivors pay rent and provides other post-disaster

* Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review. I am grateful for the help of Professors
Bradford C. Mank and Elizabeth McCord, as well my peers Lisa Rosenof and Austin Wishart, whose
invaluable contributions greatly improved this Comment. I also have profound thanks to give the editorial
staff for their help in polishing this draft for publication. Finally, Keeley Gogul deserves special mention.
Her guidance, support, and mentorship throughout my law school experience mean the world to me.
1. Tim Craig et al., Hurricane Ida Barrels into Louisiana, Causing Catastrophic Damage with
Wind, Rain and Storm Surge, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/hurricane-ida-brings-widespread-damange-to-southeast-louisiana/2021/08/29/72fa792c08dd-11ec-a6dd-296ba7fb2dce_story.html [https://perma.cc/BX9Z-GWC5].
2. Id.
3. Thomas Frank, Deaths from Hurricane Ida Expose Flaws in FEMA Flood Maps, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/deaths-from-hurricane-ida-expose-flaws-infema-flood-maps/ [https://perma.cc/AVA9-FPCT]. See also Rebecca Baird-Remba, Hurricane Ida
Caused $16B to $24B in Damage in the Northeast, Report Finds, COM. OBSERVER (Sept. 10, 2021)
(estimating that Hurricane Ida caused between sixteen and twenty-four billion dollars worth of property
damage in the northeast United States), https://commercialobserver.com/2021/09/hurricane-ida-caused16b-to-24b-in-damage-in-the-northeast-report-finds/ [https://perma.cc/9EBC-Z9RE].
4. See e.g., John K. Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA’s
Failure to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 443, 444 (2008).
5. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208
(2021).
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housing assistance.6 However, in its four-decade history, FEMA has
erroneously denied thousands of eligible applicants post-disaster housing
assistance.7 Advancing the right to housing is difficult enough in nondisaster circumstances; doing so in the aftermath of a catastrophe is much
harder.8 The post-disaster needs of entire communities, all being urgently
addressed in tandem by the immense machinery of both government
agencies and non-governmental organizations, dwarf the rights of
individuals, such that the needs of survivors get overlooked or left behind
in error.9
This Comment examines the Stafford Act’s housing provisions to show
that FEMA repeatedly and erroneously denies survivors their housing
benefits primarily due to a critical defect in the Act: the section on housing
assistance is written in discretionary rather than mandatory terms. Due to
this shortcoming, legislatures and judges are unable to protect survivors
from FEMA’s mistaken denials of assistance. When the destructive
impact of natural disasters is exacerbated by failures of manmade systems
such as FEMA, those systems should be recalibrated.
This Comment demonstrates the need for more robust federal natural
disaster relief systems. Section II of this Comment will explain the
science of natural disasters, the Stafford Act’s specific housing
provisions, and how federal courts have addressed FEMA denials in the
past. Section III argues that the phenomenon of erroneous denials can be
put to rest either by Congressional amendment of the Stafford Act, or by
the common law establishment of a due process right to receipt of FEMA
assistance. While either remedy would suffice, the ideal solution is to
implement both.
II. BACKGROUND
Before the Discussion section provides a proposal to reform the laws
governing FEMA, this Section will explain the background necessary to
understand why the U.S. law of disaster recovery needs reforming. Part
A of this Section will illustrate the increasing frequency and intensity of
major natural disasters in the twenty-first century. Then, Part B will
explain the basics of the American disaster management system with a
focus on FEMA, the Stafford Act, and the types of individual post-disaster
6. Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 444.
7. Damian Williams, Sheltering Deprivations: FEMA, Section 408 Housing, and Procedural
Redesign, 116 YALE L.J. 1883 (2007).
8. Charles W. Gould, The Right to Housing Recovery After Natural Disasters, 22 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 169, 181 (2009) (detailing the “daunting” task of housing the world’s poor prior to a disaster, and
arguing that a nation’s response to additional housing burdens post-disaster is a measure of that nation’s
commitment to housing rights).
9. Id.
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assistance FEMA is authorized to provide. Finally, Parts C and D will
explore constitutional due process and how courts have applied it to cases
on FEMA assistance, respectively.
A. Five Feet High and Rising: Natural Disasters in the
Twenty-First Century
The desolation in Hurricane Ida’s wake is certainly familiar to those
for whom Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, Irma, and Maria remain vivid
memories. Even in this decade, Ida was not an isolated event. In the
United States there were 22 disasters in 2020 alone that each caused one
billion dollars of damage or more, including wildfires in California,
Oregon, and Washington, and tornadoes in Tennessee.10 2021 was no
calmer. According to the National Hurricane Center, “[t]he 20 named
storms through the end of September is well above the 30-year (19912020) average of 9 to 10 named storms. . .”11 By October, major disaster
activity in the Atlantic basin was already almost fifty percent above the
long-term average.12
Any major disaster is liable to cause major damage. Between 1980 and
July 2019, 250 disasters caused more than one billion dollars of damage
each.13 Over 120 disasters between 2010-2020 surpassed the one billion
dollar threshold,14 nearly double the previous decade.15 The magnitude of
10. U.S. 2020 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters (graphic), NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/nationalfacts/img/fast-fact-weather-climatedisasters.jpg [https://perma.cc/67TG-CQHT] (last accessed Mar. 29, 2022).
11. NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., MONTHLY ATLANTIC
TROPICAL WEATHER SUMMARY (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/text/MIATWSAT.shtml
[https://perma.cc/25LJ-BGZU] (accessed Dec. 2, 2021).
12. Id.
13. Danshera Wetherington Cords, An Inflection Point for Disaster Relief: Superstorm Sandy, 35
TOURO L. REV. 925 (2019).
14. See e.g., Id. at 926 (2012’s Hurricane Sandy cost $70.2 billion, 2017’s Hurricane Maria cost
$90 billion); NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TROPICAL CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE HARVEY (May 9, 2018) (2017’s Hurricane Harvey cost $125 billion),
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDM3-8BRZ]; NAT’L
HURRICANE CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE
IRMA
(Sept.
24,
2021)
(2017’s
Hurricane
Irma
cost
$50
billion),
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112017_Irma.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YSU2-ND64];
NAT’L
HURRICANE CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE
FLORENCE
(May
30,
2019)
(2018’s
Hurricane
Florence
cost
$24
billion),
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL062018_Florence.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZR8-TGH6]; NAT’L
HURRICANE CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE
DORIAN
(Apr.
20,
2020)
(2019’s
Hurricane
Dorian
cost
$1.6
billion),
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL052019_Dorian.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9P3-46C8].
15. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Summary Stats, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVT’L. INFO (showing that the United States experienced 123
billion-dollar weather events from 2010-2019, compared to 63 billion-dollar weather events from 20002009), https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/summary-stats [https://perma.cc/FQE4-UP2S].
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damage derives from the ferocity the disasters of our time inflict.
Hurricane Harvey in 2017 “carried more rain to the Houston, Texas, area
than ever before seen in one storm”16 while “Hurricane Irma the same
year maintained extreme winds for longer than ever recorded.”17
These storms damage more than just property. Thousands of people
died in Puerto Rico as a result of Hurricane Maria.18 People drowned in
their New York City apartments when Ida’s floodwaters poured down
streets that were outside of official flood zones.19 The arbitrary lines of a
flood map are of little help when your kitchen is underwater.20
The problem is not on track to improve. Hurricanes form as part of an
interaction between high ocean temperature and low air pressure,
normally near the equator,21 meaning that as global temperatures continue
to rise,22 hurricanes will make landfall with greater ferocity.23 In addition
to contributing to increased hurricane activity, high temperatures also
create ideal conditions for severe wildfires, leading to a noticeable uptick
in their frequency and potential to inflict damage.24 Flooding also
increases as rivers swell with melted snow and ice and eat up more land

16. LUCY JONES, THE BIG ONES: HOW NATURAL DISASTERS HAVE SHAPED US (AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT THEM) 152 (2018).
17. Id.
18. Yxta Maya Murray, What FEMA Should Do After Puerto Rico: Toward Critical
Administrative Constitutionalism, 72 ARK. L. REV. 165, 170 (2019); see also Sheri Fink, Nearly a Year
After Puerto Rico Revises Death Toll to 2975, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/Z29G-TA98].
19. Frank, supra note 3.
20. The author worked with disaster survivors in Texas and Louisiana in 2016 who were deemed
ineligible for both flood insurance and FEMA assistance because their homes sat outside of arbitrarilydrawn flood maps. The narrow scope of this article is limited, however, to survivors who do fit FEMA’s
eligibility criteria.
21. JONES, supra note 16, at 151-52.
22. Sarah Kaplan and Brady Dennis, The World is Running Out of Options to Hit Climate Goals,
WASH. PO. (Apr. 4, 2022) (“The world is already more than a degree warmer than it was before people
started burning fossil fuels. Yet since the [U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change]’s first
warning, greenhouse gas emissions have moved almost exclusively in one direction: up.”),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/04/04/climate-change-report-unitednations-ipcc/ [https://perma.cc/M8BT-TPCX].
23. Tom Knutson, Global Warming and Hurricanes, GEOPHYSICAL FLUID DYNAMICS
LABORATORY, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Aug. 9, 2021) (projecting that tropical cyclone
intensity will rise by one to ten percent, and rainfall will increase by one to fifteen percent, based on a two
degree Celsius temperature rise), https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-hurricanes/
[https://perma.cc/489W-6AUK].
24. Alejandra Borunda, The Science Connecting Wildfires to Climate Change, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 17, 2020) (“[C]limate-related changes have vastly increased the likelihood that fires
will start more often and burn more intensely and widely than they have in the past.”),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/climate-change-increases-risk-fires-western-us
[https://perma.cc/U6ER-AFKQ].

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss4/7

4

Rando: Mitigating the Discretion Disaster: How Changes in the Law Can He

2022]

MITIGATING THE DISCRETION DISASTER

1269

to accommodate the flow.25
As temperatures rise, so too does the number of disasters. As United
States District Judge for the Central District of California Josephine
Staton, sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
prophesied regarding the deteriorating condition of the environment, the
inevitable result of rising temperatures is nothing less than “an
inhospitable future . . . marked by rising seas, coastal city functionality
loss, mass migrations, resource wars, food shortages, heat waves, megastorms. . .”26 If the American people are to survive such a future, swift
action may be necessary.
B. FEMA: Process & Problems
FEMA has existed since 1979. In its forty-two year history, the agency
has provided temporary housing and other aid to survivors of numerous
major disasters.27 Below, Subpart 1 will provide historical context for
disaster response at the federal level, leading up to passage of the Stafford
Act. Then, Subpart 2 will illustrate some of FEMA’s prominent blunders.
Subpart 3 describes the process for acquiring FEMA aid with a focus on
individual housing. Finally, Subpart 4 will briefly address relevant
portions of the Administrative Procedure Act and some suggested
improvements to FEMA’s model.
1. FEMA & The Stafford Act
In the summer of 1926, heavy rainfall across the Mississippi River
Basin in the Midwest began a series of record-breaking floods.28 Through
the normally dry autumn and into early 1927, floods killed dozens and
left thousands homeless in Chattanooga, Nashville, Cincinnati, and
Pittsburgh.29 In the spring, the river carried so much water so quickly that
it caused levees that “were so vast as to seem impregnable” to fail.30
That April, one million acres were submerged under ten feet of water
flowing at twice the speed of Niagara Falls, displacing nearly half of
Mounds Landing, Mississippi’s 180,000 residents.31 Nevertheless, thenPresident Coolidge refused to authorize direct relief payments to citizens

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

JONES, supra note 16, at 98.
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1176 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).
Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 444.
JONES, supra note 16, at 102.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
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who had been affected by the Great Mississippi Flood.32 Coolidge (like
many others) believed that disaster recovery was a local issue and that it
was inappropriate for the federal government to spend the public’s money
to help individuals, and he worried that so-called federal aid would find
its way into the pockets of already wealthy plantation owners instead of
those who had truly suffered.33 Still, public backlash after Mounds
Landing inspired Coolidge to put Herbert Hoover in charge of federal
rescue efforts.34 The result was the 1928 Flood Control Act, through
which the government funded a massive flood control engineering
program to build new reservoirs.35 However, the Act failed to offer any
support to individual survivors.36
Disasters over the following decades led to other measures, such as the
New Deal-era creation of agencies meant to help farmers recover from
the Dust Bowl and the Federal Disaster Relief Act (“FDRA”) in 1950.37
Though the FDRA authorized the government to spend federal funds on
disaster recovery, implementation was still an uncoordinated and
confusing process undertaken by multiple agencies.38
In 1979, President Carter signed Executive Order 12127, creating and
activating FEMA with a stroke of the pen.39 Almost a decade later,
President Reagan signed the Stafford Act into law, establishing the
statutory framework under which FEMA still operates today.40 FEMA’s
mission, as laid out in the Stafford Act, is to expedite “the rendering of
aid, assistance, and emergency services, and the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of devastated areas.”41 In 2003, FEMA joined several other
agencies under the umbrella of the newly-formed Department of
Homeland Security.42 In the decades since FEMA was created and the
Stafford Act was passed, FEMA has become one of the most essential
pillars of the nation’s emergency management system. 43

32. Id. at 152.
33. Id. at 108, 112.
34. Id. at 107.
35. Id. at 112, 152
36. Id.
37. Id. at 152-53.
38. Id. at 153-54 (“In the 1970s, disaster relief was provided in some instances by more than one
hundred different governmental agencies”).
39. 3 C.F.R 376 (1979), https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/eo/eo-12127.htm [https://perma.cc/N9PBHA82].
40. Stafford Act, FEMA (July 6, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/disaster/stafford-act
[https://perma.cc/BV7M-5KWA]; see also History of FEMA, FEMA (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://www.fema.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/6ENN-L6VL].
41. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a).
42. History of FEMA, supra note 40.
43. Williams, supra note 7, at 1883.
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2. The FEMA Process & Individual Aid
The American emergency management system operates on the tenet
that disasters occur locally.44 Local officials have complete autonomy and
authority to handle crises, and when a disaster overwhelms their
capabilities, they may call upon the state for help.45 After that, if the state
is also overwhelmed (or anticipates being overwhelmed due to high
demand for local relief), the Governor asks the President to declare a
“major disaster.”46 A major disaster is:
[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high
water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion . . . which in the determination of the
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant
major disaster assistance . . .47

A presidential declaration triggers FEMA to act via the Stafford Act.48
FEMA’s role is primarily (though not exclusively) a dispenser of financial
aid.49 Thus, the presidential declaration must designate the types of aid
FEMA is authorized to make available for that disaster.50 Among other
things, the designation might include individual assistance grants for
housing and home repairs, personal property losses, and medical and
funeral expenses, or grants to state and local governments for repair or
reconstruction of public facilities and infrastructure.51
The Stafford Act enables FEMA to give individuals temporary housing
assistance in Section 408. Under Section 408, “The President may provide
financial or other assistance . . . to respond to the disaster-related housing
needs of individuals and households who are displaced from their predisaster primary residences or whose pre-disaster primary residences are
rendered uninhabitable as a result of damage caused by a major
disaster.”52 Assistance available under Section 408 may include money
for repairs to or replacement of homes damaged or destroyed by the
disaster, disaster-related needs such as replacement of personal property,
or temporary housing assistance to hold survivors over until their pre44. JONES, supra note 16, at 161.
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 5170.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2).
48. Santos v. FEMA, 327 F. Supp. 3d 328, 332-33 (D. Mass. 2018).
49. JONES, supra note 16, at 161.
50. Santos, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 334.
51. Understanding FEMA Individual Assistance and Public Assistance, FEMA (Nov. 29, 2020),
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/understanding-fema-individual-assistance-and-public-assistance
[https://perma.cc/N34K-V985].
52. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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disaster residences can be repaired.53 Temporary housing assistance may
come in two forms: (1) financial assistance intended to pay for renting
alternate housing; and (2) temporary housing units.54 FEMA’s provision
of Section 408 assistance may not exceed eighteen months from the date
of the President’s disaster declaration—though this time limit may be
extended under extraordinary circumstances.55
An individual or household is eligible for Section 408 assistance if they
have been displaced from their home, or the home has been rendered
uninhabitable as a result of a major disaster.56 In addition to this
requirement, FEMA’s implementing regulations outline additional
criteria. For instance, FEMA may only provide Section 408 assistance:
[W]hen the individual or household has incurred a disaster-related
necessary expense or serious need in the state in which the disaster has
been declared . . . [and] when the applicant agrees to refund FEMA or the
State any portion of the assistance that the applicant receives or is eligible
to receive as assistance from another source.57

Additionally, FEMA will only pay for damage that is uninsured or
underinsured58 in order to ensure that it does not aid individuals who can
get assistance through other means.59
The language of these rules is discretionary (i.e., the President may,
rather than shall; FEMA may).60 Yet according to FEMA’s internal
policies, once an applicant is deemed eligible for assistance, some sort of
assistance will be provided.61 FEMA asserts that it only uses its statutory
discretion to determine which type of assistance they will provide the
applicant.62 But this is not the case in practice. Survivors have criticized
FEMA for erroneously denying hundreds of thousands of meritorious
Section 408 claims.63 One report shows that “FEMA’s section 408
53. Santos, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 334.
54. Id. at 333.
55. 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(e) (2016). What constitutes extraordinary circumstances is more or less
left to FEMA’s discretion; see e.g., Williams, supra note 7 at 1883 (“Indeed, FEMA recently bowed to
public pressure and extended the duration of housing benefits for Katrina survivors.”).
56. Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1)).
57. Id. at 732-33 (citing 44 C.F.R. § 206.113).
58. Williams, supra note 7, at 1885 (citing 44 C.F.R § 206.110); see also supra note 20
(acknowledging survivors whose homes fall outside of FEMA’s flood maps).
59. Ridgely, 513 F.3d at 732.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1).
61. McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818 (E.D. La. 2006) (“Here FEMA admits that all
persons meeting the impartial eligibility criteria above are entitled to assistance, and all of them will
receive it.”).
62. Id. at 818 n.25.
63. Williams, supra note 7, at 1883; see also Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 447 (“Over
200,000 people were displaced and evacuated to distant places . . . FEMA’s failure and in some cases
refusal to provide housing assistance to Katrina victims resulted in problems that still linger”).
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stewardship documented a 50% error rate in a sample of approximately
12,000 housing denials.”64 Other survivors have noted “FEMA’s curious,
but seemingly widespread, pattern of denying housing damage in areas
that the agency’s own geospatial mapping showed to be entirely
uninhabitable.”65 Another criticism is that FEMA’s appeal process is so
convoluted that survivors fail to take advantage of it even if they were
denied benefits.66 The practical effect is unmistakable: thousands of
eligible people have been denied assistance of Section 408 benefits,
despite FEMA asserting that it will provide assistance to all those who are
eligible.
It is also worth noting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
the government can use to avoid legal liability in some situations, applies
to a subset of FEMA actions. According to the Stafford Act, the federal
government “shall not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or
performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty . . . in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.”67
Because providing temporary housing assistance is discretionary, the
Stafford Act’s sovereign immunity clause “precludes judicial review of
disaster relief claims” based upon FEMA’s errors implementing Section
408.68
3. FEMA’s Failures: When the Cavalry Doesn’t Show
FEMA is not only one of the most essential pillars of American
emergency management; it is also one of the most distrusted.69 A
complete account of FEMA’s failures could occupy an entire volume of
scholarship. While recent debacles are well documented and well
known—the savage conditions in the New Orleans Superdome following
Hurricane Katrina come to mind70—it is worth dragging a few of the

64. Williams, supra note 7, at 1886 (citing Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing
Storm: How Disaster Recovery Excludes Those Most in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 36-37 (2006)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1884 (“[A] significant number of families in need simply dropped out of the [appeals]
program, due to factors such as FEMA’s administrative incompetence, the difficulty in dealing with
FEMA…”).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (emphasis added).
68. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004,
1008 (11th Cir. 1987)).
69. Williams, supra note 7, at 1883 (claiming that despite the agency’s responsibility for over a
million survivors, FEMA’s “constellation of well-documented failures” has eroded public confidence in
its capabilities).
70. Nate Scott, Refuge of Last Resort: Five Days Inside the Superdome for Hurricane Katrina,
USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015) (detailing violence, sexual assault, death, food rot, and sewage failures while
thousands of survivors awaited evacuation by FEMA), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/08/refuge-of-lastresort-five-days-inside-the-superdome-for-hurricane-katrina [https://perma.cc/V2DG-9X7M]; see also
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agency’s other skeletons out of the closet to illustrate how grave the risk
of erroneous denials of FEMA benefits can be.
In October 1989, an earthquake struck northern California along the
San Andreas Fault during the World Series, killing sixty-three and
destroying over 18,000 homes.71 Because FEMA was waiting to
determine the availability of local housing options (there were none),
local officials had to intervene a month after the disaster to convince
FEMA to send temporary housing units, in response to which FEMA sent
a scanty 122 mobile homes.72 With winter approaching, thousands of lowincome residents had nowhere to go.73 Then, as recovery efforts got
underway over the course of the following year, FEMA solicited reports
of earthquake damage from inspectors who were careless, inadequately
trained, and racially biased.74 In short, FEMA failed to adequately address
the immediate, life-threatening loss of housing in the region.75
In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida at 160 mph and destroyed
130,000 homes, making 350,000 new homeless overnight.76 Miami-Dade
County was immediately declared a disaster zone, but three days after the
hurricane, FEMA still had not shown up.77 The local Director of
Emergency Management rightfully asked, “Where the hell is the cavalry
on this one? We need water. We need people. For God’s sake, where are
they?”78 When FEMA did arrive, it failed to notify survivors of the
availability of mortgage and rental assistance, dismantled tent cities that
had housed thousands of survivors, forced survivors to jump through
extra bureaucratic hoops to apply for assistance, and ignored its own
regulations by denying assistance to many eligible victims.79
In the fifteen years since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has continued to
draw ire and criticism. The agency’s failures touch nearly every aspect of
its mission to coordinate federal disaster response—from violating
survivors’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by using a
JONES, supra note 16, at 160 (“They deemed it uninhabitable. Maybe so, but almost twenty thousand
people were inhabiting it.”).
71. Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 457-58.
72. Id. at 460.
73. Id; see also Jay Mathews, Earthquake Swells Ranks of Homeless, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 1989),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/10/27/earthquake-swells-ranks-ofhomeless/8752ca48-cfa7-4561-b13c-c267e62fb890/.
74. Id. at 465-66 (explaining how the biases and incompetence of FEMA inspectors resulted in
“more denials and low grants for people of color and low-income people than for white and wealthy
people.” (quoting Petition to FEMA, et al.: The Continuing Disaster, Disaster Relief Agencies Fail Low
Income Earthquake Victims, 6 (1991)).
75. Id. at 461.
76. Id. at 472.
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id. (quoting Tom Mathews et al., What Went Wrong, NEWSWEEK Sept. 7, 1992, at 23).
79. Id. at 474-75.
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biased distribution process,80 to poor management,81 and everything in
between.82 Reports even urge “communities in harm’s way not to count
on FEMA in a future crisis.”83
4. Other Considerations
Under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), an agency
may not take action that is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of its
discretion.84 However, the APA does not provide for review of agency
action to the extent that “statutes preclude judicial review” or “agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law.”85 As discussed above,
the Stafford Act leaves FEMA’s Section 408 stewardship to the agency’s
discretion, and the sovereign immunity clause shields FEMA’s
misconduct from judicial review.
Furthermore, when an agency’s enabling statute is unambiguous and
clear, courts and agencies should both follow the statute.86 If the statute is
silent or ambiguous, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council requires courts to follow an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
the statute.87 The Stafford Act is not ambiguous on its face. Nevertheless,
Section II(D) will show that some courts have deferred to FEMA’s
interpretation of Section 408.

80. Murray, supra note 18, at 169 (“[T]he Stafford Act’s execution in Puerto Rico created a race,
class, and disability-rights catastrophe that is at odds with the Constitution’s promise of equal protection”).
81. Cords, supra note 13, at 952.
82. Including violations of privacy, dangerously slow release of aid funds, lack of appropriate
disaster planning, and appropriation of resources to locations where they were not needed, ensuring that
they were not available in places that they were needed. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, MANAGEMENT ALERT – FEMA DID NOT SAFEGUARD DISASTER SURVIVORS’
SENSITIVE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (2019) (FEMA violated the Privacy Act of 1974 by
releasing personal information of millions of 2017’s disaster survivors), https://www.oig
.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-03/OIG-19-32-Mar19.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TG-HVAJ]; Cords,
supra note 13, at 947 (Slow release of disaster-related benefits, as when by “August 2014, less than onequarter of the $48 billion available funds appropriated for [Hurricane Sandy] assistance had been paid
out.”); Murray, supra note 18, at 204-05, citing FEMA, 2017 HURRICANE SEASON FEMA AFTER-ACTION
REPORT iii (July 12, 2018) (FEMA lacked appropriate emergency plans for oversees U.S. territories and
blamed local governments for its own logistical failures); Thomas Frank, Why the U.S. Disaster Agency
is Not Ready for Catastrophes, SCI. AM. (Aug. 20, 2019) (FEMA’s distraction by small disasters which
local agencies were fully capable of handling, such as when on the “day Harvey made landfall near
Houston, 4,948 emergency workers were deployed to other disasters or were unavailable, meaning that
almost half of the agency’s emergency workforce was tied up”), https://www.scientificamerican.com
/article/why-the-u-s-disaster-agency-is-not-ready-for-catastrophes/ [https://perma.cc/YMA5-FTTM].
83. Murray, supra note 18, at 205.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
85. McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (E.D. La. 2006).
86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
87. Id.
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C. Due Process
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that the government
shall deprive no person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.88 To prevail on a due process claim, a plaintiff must show that
they have a legally cognizable interest.89 When it comes to governmental
benefits like those provided by FEMA, the Supreme Court has long held
that such benefits may be considered a property interest protected by due
process.90 However, not all benefits claims are protected.91 The existence
of a federal agency that provides a benefit does not create a property
interest in that benefit, “absent some legitimate claim of entitlement—
arising from statute, regulation, contract, or the like—to the benefit.”92
The Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges explained that judges may
“exercise reasoned judgment” in identifying interests protected under due
process.93 Furthermore, there are some rights which “serve as the
necessary predicate for others; their fundamentality therefore derives, at
least in part, from the necessity to preserve other fundamental
constitutional protections.”94 Suffrage, for example, is a necessary
predicate to all other rights because voting in democratic society is a
means to preserve or create other rights.95
The Supreme Court has used due process analysis many times to find
a constitutionally protected right to receive certain government benefits.
For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly the Court established a property
interest in the receipt of welfare benefits.96 In Goss v. Lopez, the Court
held that education at a public school was a protected benefit.97 In
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, the Court established that
a potential recipient’s expectation of receiving benefits strengthens a due
process claim.98 In Craft, the Court held that a public utility company

88. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
89. Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
90. Id. at 735, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
91. Id.
92. Id., citing Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 941.
93. Bradford C. Mank, Does the Evolving Concept of Due Process in Obergefell Justify Judicial
Regulation of Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change?: Juliana v. United States, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
855, 876 (Dec. 2018) (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015)).
94. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1177.
95. Id.; see also Brandon Bryer, One Vote, Two Votes, Three Votes, Four: How Ranked Choice
Voting Burdens Voting Rights and More, 90 U. CIN. L. REV. 711 (2021) (“Without the sound and secure
ability to vote, all other rights and liberties are defenseless.”) (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964)).
96. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
97. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
98. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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could not terminate customers’ service without providing legal process
because the law gave the customers an expectation of receiving that
benefit.99 In cases like these, the government may only revoke the
individual’s benefit if it provides a minimum level of legal process so the
individual at least has notice of the grounds for benefit revocation100 and
some opportunity to contest the termination.101
Do due process rights truly exist when granting the benefit in question
is left to the agency’s discretion? In Goldberg, the Court held that because
persons meeting state eligibility criteria for welfare benefits automatically
qualified for them, those individuals had a protected property interest in
receiving the benefits.102 However, where final determination of which
individuals among the many eligible would receive benefits “was left to
the ‘unfettered discretion’ of administrators, no constitutionally protected
property interest existed.”103
When a court recognizes a due process property interest, it may
evaluate the agency’s actions that allegedly caused deprivation of that
interest. Courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge test to determine whether
the “process” applied was truly “due,” or adequate.104 The test balances
three factors: (1) the individual’s property interest; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and (3) the government’s interest, including the burdens that additional or
substitute procedural requirements would impose.105
In the disaster recovery context, a court would first have to find that a
constitutionally protected due process interest exists in Section 408
assistance and then apply the Mathews three-factor test to determine
whether the process used to deny Section 408 benefits was adequate. Only
if the plaintiff meets this high bar (showing that the denial process was
not adequate) will courts vindicate his or her due process rights and
provide a remedy for the agency’s malfeasance.
D. FEMA on Trial: Is There a Due Process
Right to Section 408 Assistance?
Taking judicial action against FEMA to secure housing assistance is
99. Id.
100. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1280 (1975) (citing
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68).
101. Id.
102. McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 816 (E.D. La. 2006) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
262).
103. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972)).
104. See e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977).
105. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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“difficult, at best,” especially for low-income survivors.106 The previous
two Sections explored the bounds of FEMA’s authority to grant financial
assistance to individual survivors and the general constitutional principle
of due process. This Section will analyze how federal courts have dealt
with the question of whether due process protects an individual’s right to
receive Section 408 benefits and the impact of the Stafford Act’s
sovereign immunity clause. This survey draws on two cases from the Fifth
Circuit, one from the District Court of Massachusetts, and one from the
District Court for the District of Columbia, splitting the cases by outcome.
1. Arguments in Favor of a Due Process Right to Section 408 Benefits
The question of whether Section 408 benefits deserve constitutional
protection arose in the Fifth Circuit case McWaters v. FEMA.107 The
plaintiffs in McWaters were a class of individuals whose homes were
destroyed during Hurricane Katrina.108 Despite the destruction, FEMA
failed to grant the survivors disaster-related housing assistance.109 Among
other claims, the plaintiffs argued that FEMA’s denial of benefits
constituted a violation of due process because, as persons whose predisaster primary residences were rendered uninhabitable by a major
disaster, they were eligible to receive the benefits which the Stafford Act
authorized FEMA to confer.110
In arguments, FEMA avowed that its own internal policy was that all
persons meeting Section 408’s impartial eligibility criteria are entitled to
assistance, that all of them will receive it,111 and that “if they are eligible,
we will pay.”112 The agency stated that FEMA interprets its governing
regulations to allow discretion as to the type of assistance it provides, such
as cash payments versus mobile homes, but denying assistance altogether
is not an option.113
The McWaters court pointed out that “if FEMA has discretion to
choose whom to assist from among otherwise eligible persons, then no
constitutionally protected interest in disaster assistance exists.”114 This
tracks with the prior discussion of sovereign immunity for discretionary
acts. FEMA’s ability to claim sovereign immunity for its discretionary

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 478.
McWaters, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 818 fn. 25.
Id. at 814.
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acts withholding benefits from the survivor class members engenders the
lack of due process protection for the survivors. Coupled with the plain
discretionary language in the Stafford Act, this suggests that the plaintiffs
had no constitutionally protected interest.
However, without specifically applying Chevron deference to Section
408, the McWaters court adopted FEMA’s interpretation of the Stafford
Act, holding that policies “which require FEMA to automatically provide
assistance to all applicants deemed eligible creates a reasonable
expectation of the benefit of federal disaster assistance . . . [which] rises
to the level of a property interest protectable under the Due Process
Clause.”115 Through this reasoning, the court agreed with the plaintiffs
that they did have a due process right to Section 408 benefits.116
The court also determined that while FEMA is immune from judicial
review of those acts which are discretionary in nature, the agency
remained liable for constitutional violations—such as if FEMA denied the
plaintiffs a properly-established property right.117 To expand on that, the
court stated that “authority to review FEMA’s actions clearly exists as to
any actions that are mandated by statute, and more importantly, any
actions that may rise to the level of a constitutional violation by the
agency.”118
However, the court in McWaters ultimately held that plaintiffs failed
to prove a denial of their due process rights. FEMA’s lack of preparedness
for the volume of cases that arose after Hurricane Katrina, the court
explained, did not necessarily mean that anybody’s rights had been
violated.119
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia addressed
Section 408 benefits in ACORN v. FEMA, another post-Katrina case, in
which the plaintiffs had received transitional housing benefits from
FEMA under Section 403.120 After several extensions of its deadline to
terminate the Section 403 program, the City of Houston requested a
further extension in August 2006, which was granted to only 113 of the
thousands of people who needed it because they had been deemed
ineligible for Section 408 assistance.121 Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief,
alleging that FEMA failed to provide sufficiently detailed written
explanations for its decision denying benefits to enable them to file

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 813-14.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. FEMA, 463 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (2006).
Id. at 30.
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meaningful appeals.122 The court agreed, because the letters contained
cryptic codes that were meaningless without the explanation provided in
a separate application guide, whose language was vague and nonindividualized.123 The letters and guide did not provide adequate
explanation for FEMA’s decisions and therefore did not constitute proper
notice under the Fifth Amendment to terminate plaintiffs' protected
property rights to receive emergency housing assistance.124
The court also stated, and FEMA conceded, that the discontinuation of
benefits would “deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which
to live while he waits” for reconsideration of his case.125 Subsequently,
the court noted that a more detailed statement of FEMA’s reasons for
denying Section 408 benefits to the plaintiffs was necessary to “(1)
diminish the risk of erroneous deprivation; (2) restore the appellate review
process to the valuable safeguard it was intended to be; and (3) free these
evacuees from the ‘Kafkaesque’ application process they have had to
endure.”126 A property interest, such as the plaintiff’s interest in Section
408 housing assistance, “could not be more fundamental and overarching
than it is here.”127
2. Arguments Against a Due Process Right to Section 408 Benefits
McWaters did not reach the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but similar
questions arose in that court in another class action case, Ridgely v.
FEMA.128 Ridgely was filed by survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
who had received some Section 408 rental assistance but had then been
denied recertification of those benefits.129 The class alleged that FEMA’s
denials did not contain understandable explanations, precluded any
effective challenge of FEMA’s decision before the assistance was
discontinued, and that FEMA failed to publish standards for continued
Section 408 eligibility.130 Therefore, the class argued that FEMA acted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the APA and due
process.131 The trial court found for the plaintiffs, rejecting FEMA’s
argument that the plaintiff class lacked the property interest necessary to

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34.
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976)).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34.
Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2008)
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id.
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support a due process claim.132 Instead, the court found that the plaintiffs
did have a property right akin to the one the Supreme Court established
in Goldberg and other due process cases.133
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that “the statute and regulations
governing the rental assistance program are not sufficient to create a
property interest.”134 The analysis in Ridgely centered on the
discretionary/mandatory distinction.135 The Court stated that absent real,
substantive limitations on FEMA’s discretion, Section 408 and the
regulations did not create a constitutional property interest because “a
benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or
deny it at their discretion.”136 The Court compared this case to Mathews
v. Eldridge, in which “[t]he mandatory language [in the social security
disability statute] makes it clear that an individual who satisfies the
eligibility criteria has a legitimate expectation” of receiving the benefit.137
No specific directives in the Stafford Act or FEMA’s implementing
regulations compelled FEMA to provide assistance to anybody who
meets the eligibility criteria (let alone everybody).138 The court worried
that compelling assistance would open FEMA to the possibility of
fraud.139 The Ridgely court was also less concerned with FEMA’s own
claim that “if they are eligible, we will pay” than the McWaters court—
that claim doesn’t figure into the court’s analysis at all. In fact, FEMA’s
argument in this case was based on the opposing idea, that the agency
retained absolute discretion as to who receives Section 408 benefits.140
Thus, the provisions could not give rise to a property interest.141
Though it comes from an entirely separate federal circuit, Santos v.
FEMA follows the Ridgely court very closely in its approach to Section
408 property interests. The plaintiffs in Santos all evacuated Puerto Rico
in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria.142 FEMA had been providing Section
403 transitional assistance (temporary shelters, a typical precursor to
Section 408 housing benefits) to thousands of Puerto Ricans displaced by
Maria but announced that in June 2018,143 it would discontinue that
132. Id. at 731.
133. Id. at 732 (“[We see] no relevant difference between the plaintiff’s property rights to Section
408 benefits and those rights belonging to the plaintiffs in … Goldberg”).
134. Id. at 735.
135. Id. at 738-39.
136. Id. at 735 (quoting Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)).
137. Id. at 738.
138. Id. at 736.
139. Id. at 732.
140. Id. at 731.
141. Id. at 736.
142. Santos v. FEMA, 327 F. Supp. 3d 328, 331 (D. Mass. 2018).
143. Almost a full year after Hurricane Maria, significantly longer than the typical 5 to 14 days
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assistance.144 Among other claims, the plaintiffs alleged violation of their
due process rights and sought an injunction to prevent the termination of
benefits under Section 403 for themselves and others similarly situated
until such time as they either received temporary housing (a Section 408
benefit) or found permanent housing.145 The court ultimately denied the
plaintiffs’ request.146
In denying the injunction, the court agreed with the Ridgley court that,
“given that Section 408 and the regulations do not provide entitlement to
financial assistance, that plaintiffs were previously found eligible for
[403] assistance is of no matter.”147 Plaintiffs’ arguments, according to
the court, were undermined because Sections 403 and 408 both speak in
discretionary terms, not absolutes,148 and it agreed with Ridgely that
FEMA shall not be liable for any claim based upon a discretionary
function or duty.149 Though the court refused to find a constitutional
property interest and ultimately denied plaintiffs’ motion at bar, it did so
knowing that there was another restraining order already in place
preventing FEMA from terminating plaintiffs’ benefits until such time as
the plaintiffs’ need was gone. The court concluded by “strongly urg[ing]
the parties to work together to find temporary housing.”150
III. DISCUSSION
Ensuring that individuals and households recover as quickly and
effectively as possible is a cardinal goal of disaster recovery.151 To ensure
that courts are prepared to play an effective and meaningful role in the
American emergency response system, Congress should amend the
Stafford Act so that the language of Section 408 is mandatory rather than
discretionary. Alternatively, courts should follow McWaters in adopting
authorized for Section 403 transitional assistance, and indeed even longer than the six months post-disaster
declaration maximum for Section 403 assistance. Id. at 334.
144. Id. at 331.
145. Id. at 331-32.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 339 (citing Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 736 (5th Cir. 2008)).
148. Id. at 338 (citing Ridgely, 512 F.3d. at 735-36) (also citing Pride v. FEMA, Civ. No. 1:1CV22HSO-JMR, 2013 WL 6048153 (Section 408 benefits are discretionary and therefore, there is no
constitutionally protected property interest in receiving such benefits); Konashenko v. FEMA, No. 12CV-3034 (SJR)(WDW), 2014 WL 1761436 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2014) (FEMA had discretion whether to
award plaintiff repair funds, therefore she had no reasonable expectation that she would receive funds and
no protected property interest in receiving the funds)).
149. Id. at 333 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5148).
150. Id. at 345.
151. Anne Sikes Hornsby, Roadblock to Recovery: How FEMA’s Liability Insurance Mandate
Denies Low-Income Disaster Survivors Essential Transportation Benefits, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 735, 787
(focusing on the clear need for effective transportation in the immediate post-disaster period, for
delivering supplies and recovery personnel to disaster zones).
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FEMA’s own interpretation of the Stafford Act in order to establish a due
process right to Section 408 benefits. While either remedy on its own may
be sufficient, the ideal solution is to do both. Such a change will empower
federal courts to defend a uniform due process property interest in the
receipt of post-disaster FEMA benefits, supported by statutory authority.
Part A of this Section outlines the reasons why establishing a due
process right is an essential next step in preparing for the inevitable
increase in both the frequency and strength of natural disasters in the very
near future. Then, Part B will detail two potential avenues that can
establish the due process right. Finally, Part C will discuss various
complicating factors.
A. Why Due Process?
Without an established constitutional due process right, it is likely that
more courts will treat Section 408 benefits the way the Fifth Circuit did
in Ridgely (followed by the District Court of Massachusetts in Santos).152
Without the right, FEMA and the courts will be free to continue denying
benefits even to those who have established their eligibility. But in the
face of increasing damage from natural disasters, how can the desired
result be that a person who is eligible under the statute has no interest that
a court can protect? Like disabilities in Mathews, a natural disaster is no
fault of the victim. It is one of the most chaotic, stressful, and devastating
times in a person’s life.
Section II of this Comment established that absent some action, “the
destabilizing climate will . . . spawn life-threatening natural disasters.”153
The number and ferocity of natural disasters will escalate in tandem with
death tolls and recovery bills. Measures to reduce climate change154 will
hopefully have the added effect of reducing the number and strength of
disasters. But in the meantime, the nation (and the world) will continue to
experience catastrophes. Just as old, fragile building materials need to be
replaced with disaster-resilient components, so too must poor frameworks
of emergency management be amended to ensure they remain effective.
A comprehensive and effective system for relief and recovery must be
established to replace the current system, which is cumbersome and
faulty.
152. Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 736 (5th Cir. 2008).
153. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020).
154. Such as those introduced in President Biden’s Build Back Better Framework (The White
House, The Build Back Better Framework, https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-back-better/
[https://perma.cc/3VK6-6WKZ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021)) or discussed in the U.N. COP26 climate
conference in Glasgow (see Brady Dennis, What You Need to Know About the U.N. COP26 Climate
Summit—And Why It Matters, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2021/10/06/cop26-glasgow-un-climate-talks/ [https://perma.cc/JM5T-PZRN]).
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For some, an easy suggestion might be to relocate the residents of
disaster zones to places less susceptible—away from places like New
Orleans, which has been hit by multiple billion-dollar hurricanes this
millennium, or from cities along the San Andreas fault on the West Coast.
In fact, climate migration, the global phenomenon of people choosing to
leave home due to dangerous changes in the environment, may already be
taking shape across the United States.155
While voluntary climate migration may prove a net positive in terms
of lives lost and property damaged in disasters, compelling people to
relocate is an impracticable long-term solution to the problem of natural
disasters. In the United States, a person’s right to stay or go where they
choose is traditionally respected.156 There are deep-rooted emotional and
socioeconomic factors that prevent people in the most common disaster
zones from moving to safer locales. For example, some people don’t want
to move away from their family home (not just a family house, but their
family had been in that neighborhood for many generations),157 or they
can’t afford to move.158 Anecdotally, the author of this Comment also
discussed this issue first-hand with disaster survivors in Texas, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and Puerto Rico from 2016-2019. Their reactions to the
idea of evacuating illustrated that many people are inclined to remain in
their homes despite the associated risks from frequent, ferocious natural
disasters.
Furthermore, any plan to completely abandon disaster prone-regions,
involving mass migration inland and development of fire- and
earthquake-resilient communities, would be sure to carry an astronomical
price tag, involve great emotional turmoil, and require collaboration
amongst a politically divided government.159
155. Jake Bittle, Climate Change is Already Rejiggering Where Americans Live, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 3, 2021) (“about half of Americans who planned to move in the next year said natural disasters
were a factor in their decision.”), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/09/hurricane-idalouisiana-climate-migration/619971/ [https://perma.cc/5898-3LHA]; see also Kenzie Poole, Climate
Migrants: Who They Are and What Legal Protections Do They Have, IMMIGR. & HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
(Oct. 28, 2021) (stating that some twenty-two million refugees have been displaced from their homes by
“by profound environmental changes and disasters globally.”), http://lawblogs.uc.edu/ihrlr/2021
/10/28/climate-migrants-who-are-they-and-what-legal-protections-do-they-have/
[https://perma.cc/X2E9-MDDK].
156. See generally, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
157. Adrian Florido, Why Stay During A Hurricane? Because It’s Not As Simple As ‘Get Out’, NPR
(Oct. 18, 2018) (“Of course it’s, ‘Get out.’ But when it’s your life and your home, it’s often a lot more
challenging than that.”), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/18/658258370/why-stay-during-a-hurricanebecause-its-not-as-simple-as-get-out [https://perma.cc/N3WQ-94GE].
158. Id.; see also Bittle, supra note 155 (telling the story of Hurricane Ida survivor Milton
Thibodeaux, who would likely have to pay triple his current housing costs to move to a less disaster-prone
area than the Louisiana bayou) .
159. Cords, supra note 13, at 952 (arguing that alleviating massive human suffering should not be
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Nor is short-term evacuation always a good solution. Though it can
certainly save lives, people don’t always have enough forewarning.160 In
the case of Hurricane Katrina, when there was only nineteen hours to
make evacuation plans, “[h]ow were those without cars, one-quarter of
the city’s population, supposed to escape? . . . no other option had been
provided to them. The city didn’t use its fleet of school buses to transport
them out.”161 There are also concerns around those for whom it may be
difficult to move, such as the elderly, the disabled, and the family pets.162
Even for young, healthy families without pets, evacuating can be
expensive. Wait too long, and the only available hotel rooms are far away
and costly.163 Therefore, income inequality and similar socioeconomic
disparities are factors in who has the option to evacuate at all. There are
additional logistical factors when it comes to the United States’ island
states and territories, including Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, and Guam. Unlike the contiguous states and
Alaska, persons in the islands and territories cannot drive from their
homes to stay with friends or family in another state while they wait out
a storm. When an evacuation order comes down, there may be no choice
but to hunker down and wait for the stormwall to hit. In any event,
evacuation and migration are life-saving, not property-saving, techniques.
Even if they saved every life threatened by a disaster (which they don’t),
the survivors’ property would still be at the mercy of the storm.
Other suggestions for FEMA’s improvement include amending the
Stafford Act to afford Section 408 claimants the right to an in-person
hearing to contest their eligibility denial and to strengthen the appeals
process.164 Another idea is to embrace an “intersectional consciousness”
to reconcile FEMA’s actions with the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause,165 eliminating unnecessary delays in the aid application
a matter of politics).
160. JONES, supra note 16, at 159, 165. Note also that development of quicker, more accurate, and
widespread early warning systems has been a major focus of many international agreements relating to
effective disaster mitigation and recovery. See e.g., World Conference of Natural Disaster Reduction,
Yokohama, Japan, May 23-27, 1994, Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.172/9
(Sept. 27, 1994)); World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo, Japan, Jan. 18-22, 2005, Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.206/6 (Jan. 22, 2005); Third U.N. World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai,
Japan, March 14-18, 2015, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, U.N. Doc.
UNISDR/GE/2015 (Mar. 18, 2015), https://preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HTF5-N6FA].
161. Id.
162. Brian Resnick, Why Some People Never Evacuate During a Hurricane, According to a
Psychologist, VOX (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/25/16202296
/hurricane-florence-2018-evacuation-psychology.
163. Florido, supra note 157.
164. Williams, supra note 7, at 1887.
165. Murray, supra note 18, at 196 (encouraging FEMA to “embrace its role as a possessor of a
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process,166 and working with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to create a plan to ensure that adequate amounts of
affordable housing are available for disaster victims.167
Others suggest leaving untouched the issue of Section 408 denials,
because the risk of fraud to FEMA by people posing as survivors eligible
for Section 408 benefits appears high. Indeed, it may be true that FEMA
has paid out millions of dollars in fraudulent claims.168 The risk of further
fraud to FEMA could inspire more courts to follow Ridgely, denying
disaster victim plaintiffs the Section 408 benefits for which they are
eligible.169
But there are more appropriate responses to the possibility of fraud than
refusing aid.170 Compare the millions of dollars in fraudulent claims to the
many thousands of people improperly denied aid—those who should have
received Section 408 benefits but did not. The policies supporting the very
existence of FEMA suggest that the needs of disaster victims should hold
preference over efforts to protect the agency from fraud. In other words,
the nebulous possibility of fraud should not incentivize the government
to create roadblocks to recovery during the traumatic aftermath of
disaster. Compared to individuals or even households, FEMA is better
able to absorb the cost of its erroneous decisions.171 In fact, one could
argue that absorbing costs associated with disaster recovery is part of
FEMA’s raison d’être. Therefore, it would work better to grant benefits
to all of those who are eligible to receive them and then put the onus on
FEMA to correct itself if it errs rather than risk denying those truly in
need.
Establishing a due process right to post-disaster housing assistance
would not expose FEMA to the kinds of fraud Ridgely anticipated. This
constitutional development would not be a blank check for anybody who
wanted FEMA money. It is not as though every person who sets foot in a
constitutional duty” under the Equal Protection Clause, to consider the realities and unique narratives of
the communities in which the agency operates).
166. Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 493.
167. Id.
168. Williams, supra note 7 at 1883; see also James Finn, Scammers are Posing as Hurricane Ida
Victims, Trying to Get FEMA Money. Here’s What You Can Do, THE ADVOCATE (Oct. 7, 2021)
(“Scammers are trying to exploit [FEMA]’s efforts to help people whose homes were damaged and lives
were disrupted”), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_fe7075a6-26ec-11ec-8b946fffc3cf3dc1.html#:~:text=You%20can%20report%20scams%2C%20fraud,be%20found%20at%20this
%20link.
169. Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 732 (5th Cir. 2008).
170. For example, rather than withholding aid at the outset and risk denying benefits to those who
truly need them, allow FEMA to challenge a grant of benefits if the agency later has reason to suspect the
claim was fraudulent. Because post-disaster needs are great and immediate, this method would allow
FEMA to protect itself from fraud in the aftermath without denying benefits when the immediate need
arises.
171. Williams, supra note 7, at 1891.
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disaster zone is entitled to FEMA’s assistance. Applicants would still
need to establish eligibility under the Section 408 criteria. The main effect
of a due process right would be to ensure that those who are eligible—
like the plaintiffs in Ridgely, McWaters, Santos, and ACORN—are not
denied their benefits. Instead, any plaintiff improperly denied Section 408
benefits would have a cause of action against FEMA. Establishing this
right would ensure that courts faced with FEMA denials would analyze
those denials for adequacy of process under a Mathews v. Eldridge
framework. A due process right would go a long way toward augmenting
victims’ likelihood of actually receiving the benefit to which they are
entitled.
B. Methods to Establish a Right to Section 408 Benefits
Establishing new constitutional rights may seem like a monumental
task worthy of much strain and commotion, but more is not necessarily
better when a few carefully-crafted changes will do the trick.172 Striking
down the Stafford Act or repealing the entire thing would leave FEMA
powerless to provide aid that is available in the event of a major
disaster.173 Even if striking the Act were a good idea, doing so would
likely prove difficult (at best) due to Congressional gridlock. Luckily, it
is not necessary to strike the Stafford Act and replace it with a whole new
statute. There are two possible avenues for properly establishing the right
to receipt of post-disaster FEMA benefits: (1) a legislative remedy
consisting of a few carefully-crafted amendments to the Stafford Act; or
(2) a judicial remedy following McWaters. Either of these remedies will
serve to further the policy permeating Section 408, that of providing
“temporary housing assistance to families and individuals who have lost
their homes because of a natural disaster.”174 Section III(B)(1) will
address the legislative remedy while Section III(B)(2) will address the
judicial remedy.
1. A Few Carefully-Crafted Changes: The Legislative Remedy
A benefit is not protected if the government has discretion to grant or
deny it.175 Thus, the first necessary change is to amend Section 408’s
discretionary language so that it becomes mandatory. As the case law
172. Id. at 1887.
173. Murray, supra note 18, at 171 (“. . . if 2017 taught us anything, it was that natural disasters can
create cataclysms that imperil life and property to such a degree that it would be madness to strike down
a law that allows the federal government to respond to these catastrophes with its resources.”).
174. Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 492.
175. Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 756 (5th Cir. 2008).
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demonstrates, as long as FEMA retains discretion to deny assistance to
those who meet the statutory eligibility criteria, most courts are likely to
defer to the agency’s decisions. Nor will such decisions be reviewed in
court because the sovereign immunity clause bars judicial review over
discretionary actions. If the statutory language remains discretionary,
there is no security or guarantee for post-disaster benefits. Where the
disputed action relates to a mandatory function, neither the case law nor
the Stafford Act’s sovereign immunity clause can protect FEMA from
judicial review.176
The McWaters court adopted FEMA’s own interpretations as to the
type of discretion afforded to it by the Stafford Act. Meanwhile in
Ridgely, FEMA stated a different reading altogether, and in any case, the
court’s analysis ignored FEMA’s interpretation. Modifying Section 408
so that its housing provisions are mandatory will not only ensure that
FEMA provides housing assistance to all survivors who meet the
eligibility criteria, and that any refusals to do so will be reviewable in
court, but will also alleviate the confusion caused by differing
interpretations of the Stafford Act by generating a clear, uniform
interpretation. With this modification, finding that disaster plaintiffs have
a right to Section 408 benefits will not be a stroke of luck based on
FEMA’s representations about its own policies, as it was in McWaters.
Amending the Stafford Act will ensure that FEMA’s duty to deliver
assistance to the eligible is actually mandatory.
In Ridgely, the Ninth Circuit helpfully provided a model of what the
Stafford Act could look like in order for the court to hold FEMA liable
for denying benefits to eligible applicants.177 The social security disability
statute which served as the model reads, “[e]very individual who . . . is
under a disability . . . shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit . .
. for each month beginning with the first month . . . in which he becomes
so entitled to such insurance benefits.”178 If Section 408 read “the
President shall provide financial or other assistance . . . to respond to the
disaster-related housing needs of individuals and households” instead of
“the President may provide,” courts would have significantly less wiggle
room to hold that “the statute and regulations governing the rental
assistance program are not sufficient to create a property interest.”179
Instead, this amendment would be a real, substantive limitation on
FEMA’s ability to deny assistance and give courts the authority to support
disaster victims’ claims of entitlement to Section 408 benefits.
The other suggested improvements to FEMA, such as allowing for in176.
177.
178.
179.

Hornsby, supra note 151, at 789
Ridgely, 513 F.3d at 738.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 735.
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person hearings to contest eligibility denials and strengthening the
appeals process, are undoubtedly vital and important. But as long as
FEMA retains discretion to refuse assistance to anybody who is eligible,
those improvements remain paper tigers. What good is an in-person
hearing to contest an eligibility denial if FEMA is under no mandate to
provide assistance once somebody has proven their eligibility? Nor does
amending the appeals process take priority to amending Section 408.
Even if FEMA’s appeal process was straightforward, disaster victims are
not often in a position to wait for an appeal. In an emergency, disaster
survivors need immediate help and cannot always afford to wait, let alone
pay, for an appeal. Making Section 408 mandatory may cut down on the
number of appeals that assistance applicants file.
Furthermore, this amendment will eliminate ambiguity from the
Stafford Act’s individual housing provisions. If Section 408 is clear and
unambiguous, it will no longer be subject to Chevron deference—
meaning that any interpretation FEMA may concoct to avoid issuing
benefits to every person deemed eligible will hold no weight upon review
in court.
2. Interpreting the Statute: The Judicial Remedy
Among historically protected rights there is the right “to be free from,
and obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal
security.”180 What is the intrusion on personal security in disaster
recovery cases? Certainly, FEMA itself is not a Category Five hurricane
flooding the town, nor an earthquake shaking foundations at magnitude
seven on the Richter scale, nor a raging wildfire. The agency itself may
not be a cataclysm intruding on the victims’ personal security. However,
in some ways, the term ‘natural disaster’ is a misnomer, because these
events are not inherently destructive to the natural world; they are
destructive to human systems.181 They are destructive in part because of
the fragility of human systems. Decades of engineering and urban
planning decisions left Mounds Landing surrounded by inadequate
levees, and there were no spillways, outflows, or reservoirs that may have
mitigated the damage of the Great Mississippi Flood.182 Natural disasters
are really the human, governmental failure to prepare and respond.183 It is
imperative to maximize the potential of the courts to mitigate the
180. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
181. JONES, supra note 16, at 114.
182. Id. at 100-01.
183. Paul Rando, There Are No Natural Disasters, INT’L L. SOC’Y NEWSLETTER, May 7, 2021
(“[W]hat is a ‘natural disaster,’ other than the failure to reduce risk and make resilient communities?”),
https://sway.office.com/9N9JSe1z0U6nGaYq?red=Link [https://perma.cc/4U43-RCKU].
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disastrous human consequences of natural events. “The best investment
in a resilient community is to identify such weaknesses and repair them—
before the event.”184 Thus, courts should be armed with the means to
correct FEMA’s mistakes.
A property interest could not be more fundamental and overarching
than the right to receive Section 408 post-disaster benefits.185 The
question of whether post-disaster assistance is a constitutionally protected
property interest is almost certain to reach more Circuit Courts (and
eventually the Supreme Court) in the foreseeable future. When it does,
courts should follow McWaters, giving anybody who is eligible for
Section 408 benefits a constitutionally protected property interest in
receipt of their FEMA assistance. This is true even in the absence of a
statutory amendment of the Stafford Act.
It is well-established that “Congress cannot preclude judicial review of
allegedly unconstitutional agency action.”186 Even an agency’s
discretionary acts that are otherwise precluded from judicial review by
sovereign immunity may be reviewed in court if the claim alleges
constitutional violations.187 This is because “adherence to constitutional
guidelines is not discretionary, it is mandatory.”188 Therefore, if Section
408 benefits were a constitutionally protected interest, FEMA’s decisions
to deny assistance to eligible individuals would become reviewable in
court for allegedly violating the Constitution.
Additionally, depriving the property interest in government benefits of
somebody who is eligible to receive them verges upon
unconstitutionality. If FEMA deprives an individual of equal treatment
under the law—if one eligible person is denied the same benefits another
eligible person received—it is unconstitutional.189 When the only basis
for a deprivation is agency discretion, the deprivation hews too close to
the termination of public welfare benefits held unconstitutional in
Goldberg v. Kelly.190 Doing so deprives a property interest without due
process of law because it is completely arbitrary.
Courts should follow the McWaters court in establishing that disaster
plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected property interest in Section
408 benefits on the basis of FEMA’s purported interpretation that the
decision whether to grant the benefit is mandatory: that all who are
184. JONES, supra note 17, at 115.
185. Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. FEMA, 463 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (2006).
186. Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)); Campbell v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 694 F.2d 305, 307 (3d
Cir. 1982).
187. Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4, at 479.
188. Id. (citing Rosas 826 F.2d at 1008).
189. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
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eligible will receive some assistance. By following this reasoning to
establish a due process right, courts can truly review FEMA’s actions for
constitutional adequacy under Mathews. It involves a bit of circular
reasoning, but once the constitutional right is established, the agency’s
discretionary acts (as actually written in the statute) become reviewable
because the denial of Section 408 benefits would trigger constitutional
claims.
Establishing a property interest would be a major boon to disastervictim plaintiffs like those in Ridgely and Santos. Courts would be in a
position to apply the Mathews analysis every time FEMA’s denial of
Section 408 benefits appeared in court. The survivor’s interest in the
benefits necessary to establish a safe home or shelter, and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest, would weigh heavily against
FEMA’s concerns of fraud.
The courts can establish a due process right even if Congress fails to
amend the Stafford Act. Doing so will only require courts to be cognizant,
as was the court in McWaters,191 that FEMA’s policy sufficiently
narrowed its discretion to deny a legitimate claim of entitlement to 408
assistance.192 Absent mandatory language in a statute, a property interest
may still arise from “administrative understandings.” 193 If the Circuit
Courts or the Supreme Court follow McWaters, they could find that
FEMA’s purported internal policies effectively make Section 408 a
mandatory statute. Such a holding would ensure that people who meet the
eligibility requirements would have a private right of action if FEMA
denied them their benefits.
3. Ideally Both
The most effective strategy would be to implement both remedies—
they should complement each other. Ridgely proves that courts would be
much more comfortable finding and upholding a constitutionally
protected property interest in Section 408 benefits if the statutory
language was already mandatory instead of discretionary. However, while
the statutory remedy would make courts more likely to implement the
judicial remedy, congressional gridlock in the twenty-first century makes
achieving substantive statutory changes difficult.194 Likewise, while
191. McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818 (E.D. La. 2006).
192. Ridgely v. FEMA, 513 F.3d 727, 739 (5th Cir. 2008) (“It may be the case that FEMA’s policies
in administering the rental assistance program require it to make awards . . . to all eligible applicants”).
193. Id. at 740 (citing Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. Of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 931 (5th Cir.
1988)).
194. Lee Drutman, How Much Longer Can This Era of Political Gridlock Last?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-longer-can-this-era-of-political-gridlocklast/.
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endorsement from the judiciary would lend credence to a statutory
amendment, stare decisis and the principal of judicial restraint sometimes
make courts hesitant to establish new constitutional rights.195
Furthermore, courts may argue that this issue is for the political branches
to solve. Each of the remedies would certainly support the case for
establishing the other. Thus, because either option would clearly be
sufficient to protect eligible disaster survivors from FEMA’s erroneous
decision to deny them Section 408 assistance, in the absence of both,
either will suffice.
C. Complicating Factors
The two-factor method to enshrine a due process right to Section 408
benefits laid out above is not without its pitfalls. Though none of these
complicating factors, in and of themselves, are convincing reasons to
refrain from acting, any legislature or court seeking to implement the
changes proposed above should consider them.
Significantly, the primary method of providing disaster relief for major
disasters continues to be via “supplemental appropriations.”196 Congress
authorizes a certain budget for FEMA each year, but FEMA usually needs
to request supplemental funds to prepare for major disasters.197 Thus,
barring adjustment of the appropriation scheme, Congress may be hesitant
to amend the Stafford Act in a way that could require FEMA to pay out
even more money.
Making it mandatory for FEMA to provide Section 408 benefits to all
eligible persons also runs the risk that Congress (in the Stafford Act) or
FEMA (in its implementing regulations) will make the eligibility
standards themselves significantly more stringent. By doing so, they
could ensure that the number of payouts FEMA actually makes does not
increase. On the other hand, this could be a positive outcome—stricter
FEMA eligibility standards could inspire a certain amount of benevolent
restraint on the agency’s part. FEMA could stop focusing on small
disasters where local and state agencies are already capable of covering
costs.198 Instead, FEMA could start diverting its existing resources to
where they are needed most.

195. See e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
281, 283 (1990) (citing South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging concern about overturning decisions that are “so embedded in our system of government
that return is no longer possible”)).
196. Cords, supra note 13, at 954.
197. Id. at 933.
198. Frank, supra note 82 (stating that FEMA’s “distraction” by small pre-Harvey disasters led to
a delayed and ineffective response when the hurricane struck).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Have four decades, hundreds of disasters, and thousands of erroneous
denials of housing assistance taught FEMA anything about effective
disaster mitigation? Survivors across the United States would answer with
“a resounding chorus of ‘No.’”199 As global temperatures increase, and
catastrophes become more common and more violent, so too do the risk
and potential consequences of erroneously depriving survivors their postdisaster benefits.
In the hurricane’s torrential downpour, in the thunderous flood, water
nurtures the soil and carries mineral resources vital to natural evolution.200
Fire cleanses the forest, sparking new and diverse life.201 What humanity
calls “natural disaster” is really tabula rasa (a clean slate) for the natural
world. While the inevitabilities of the natural world will not change, the
human systems that have been created to deal with the effects of those
inevitabilities can—and must—be reformed. It is not necessary to wait
until FEMA recognizes the need to do better; the disaster has already
struck. Time after time, FEMA has denied benefits for those who are
eligible. Ensuring that survivors who are eligible for Section 408 benefits
receive those benefits is not the only improvement that FEMA requires,
but it’s a significant one. The solution awaits in Congress, the courts, or
both.

199. Pierre & Stephenson, supra note 4 at 445.
200. Why We Need to Restore Floodplains, AMERICAN RIVERS, https://www.americanrivers.org
/threats-solutions/restoring-damaged-rivers/benefits-of-restoring-floodplains/ [https://perma.cc/HXY8YVTQ] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
201. The Ecological Benefits of Fire, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC SOC’Y (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/ecological-benefits-fire/ [https://perma.cc/C8ND-83A8].
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